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GLOBAL WARMING AND PROPERTY
INTERESTS: PRESERVING COASTAL WETLANDS
AS SEA LEVELS RISE
Robert L. Fischman*

INTRODUCMION

This article explores an example of the challenge that global

warming presents to American property law. It examines how law
might keep pace with changing expectations about the stability and
permanence of both natural systems and property interests. Over the
past decade, coastal area managers and environmentalists have intensified their efforts to slow the draining, filling and development that
are primarily responsible for coastal marsh destruction.' These efforts
are based on a heightened awareness of the value of wetlands ecosystems.2 However, a new threat to coastal wetlands looms on the hori* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law (on leave from
the Environmental Law Institute); A.B. Princeton University, 1984; M.S. University of Michigan, 1987; J.D. University of Michigan, 1987. I am grateful to the following people who
nurtured the evolution of this article through conversation and comment: Dan Berger, Richard
Collins, Michael Green, William Futrell, Cotton Harness III, Laura Howorth, Jenifer Kohout,
James McElfish, Erik Meyers, Ronald Rychlak, Mark Squillace, Lisa St. Amand, James Titus,
and Mark Trexler. This article was written with the support of EPA assistance agreement CR813617-02 and a George Hopper faculty research grant.
1. J. KUSLER, OUR NATiONAL WEMLAND HERITAGE 6 (1983) [hereinafter J. KUSLER].
See, e-g., Maryland Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program, Nat. Res. § 8-1801
(prohibiting construction within 1000 feet of a wetland); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §
480-B (setting strict standards for issuing construction permits along marine beach systems,
which include wetlands); Louisiana Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Authority, 2d Spec.
Sess., La. Acts 6 (establishing authority to develop and implement plans to conserve, restore,
and enhance coastal wetlands).
2. Coastal wetlands comprise less than 5% of the 99 million acres of total wetlands in
the contiguous United States. Tiner, Wetlands of the United States: Current Status and Recent
Trendr, 28-29 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1984); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO1hc'TON
AGENCY, AMERICA'S WETLANDS: OUR VITAL LINK BemwEEN LAND AND WATER 12 (1990).
Today, less than half of the United States' initial stock of coastal wetlands remains. Tmer at
36-37. A transition zone that is both land and sea, these sheltered waters provide habitat for
fish, shellfish and waterfowl, protection from erosion and storm surges, and pollution control.
J. KUSLER, supra note 1, at 7. The lure of the ocean draws people to the coast and pressure
to build residential housing, resorts and marinas is growing rapidly. Tiner at 36-37. See also
T. CULIrON, M. WARREN, T. GOODSPEED, D. REwER, C. BLAcKWELL & J. MCDONOUGI
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zon that, ironically, could make futile all of the current protection
efforts that limit draining and filling. Coastal wetlands may drown
under rising seas.
Atmospheric models predict, and some evidence suggests, that
the surge of carbon dioxide and other trace gases released into the
atmosphere over the last century will contribute to a warming of the
Earth's climate.3 However, uncertainty exists over how significant the
warming will be and over what period of time warming will occur.4
As the Earth's temperature increases, sea levels will rise due to thermal expansion of water and melting of glacial and polar ice.5
Existing coastal wetlands, which are flooded periodically by
tides, will be inundated by the sea under the standard global warming
scenario. Under natural conditions, as seas rise, some coastal marshes
can migrate landward and maintain a constant vegetated edge between
fastland and open coastal waters.6 Figure 1 (A-C) shows how
IlI, FIFTY YEARS OF POPULATION CHANGE ALONG THE NATION'S COASTS: 1960-2010 (1990)

(predicting a 60% increase in coastal population from 1960 to 2010).
3. The most recent and authoritative survey of the scientific data on climate change, by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, predicts a rise in global temperatures of 1C
by 2025 and 3"C by 2200. INTERGOVENMENTAL PANEL ON Cr1MATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE - THE IPCC ScIEN'nFIC ASSESSMENT Xxii (1990) [hereinafter IPCC]. Computer
models of climate change all predict significant increases in the rate of global warming over
the next fifty years. These models predict a rise between 0.8 and 2.6"C. Jones and Wigley,
Global Warming Trends, SCL AM., August 1990, at 91 [hereinafter JonesI. Solomon &
Freedberg, The Greenhouse Effect: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 20 ENVrL. L 83 (1990),

summarize the uncertainties and effects of global warming. Solomon and Freedberg rely
heavily on U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1988) [Draft Report].

4. See Jones, supra note 3, at 91.
5. See IPCC supra note 3 (predicting a 10-30 cm rise over the next four decades);
MacDonald, Scientific Basis for the Greenhouse Effect in AGRICULTURAL, FORESTRY, AND
GLOBAL CUMATE CHANGE - A READER 76 (1989) (predicting a rise of at least one meter

over the next century).
There is some dispute over the effects of global warming on the ice caps that adds

yet another layer of uncertainty on making policy to deal with climate change issues. See the
debate over whether the Greenland ice sheet is thickening between Zwally, Growth of Green.
land Ice Sheet: Interpretation, 246 Sci. 1589 (Dec. 1989) and Douglas, et al, Greenland Ice
Sheet: Is It Growing or Shrinking?, 248 Sc. 288 (April 1990).

6. The process of wetlands migration under natural conditions generally involves both
migration to adjacent fastland as well as vertical growth through deposition of sediment and
organic material.

It is important to note that sea level rise due to global warming will occur more
rapidly than sea level fluctuations in the past. Therefore, coastal wetlands that maintained
their areas in the past may not keep pace with current rising waters and will narrow. In
some cases, depending on the slope of the shoreline profile, the wetlands may not be able to
migrate at all. The description of coastal wetlands response to sea level rise is developed
from: GREENHOUSE EFFEc, SEA LEVEL Rise AND COASTAL WETLANDS (J.G. Titus ed. 1988);
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EVOLUTION OF A MARSH AS SEA LEVEL RISES
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FIGURE 1. Evolution of a marsh as sea level rises. Coastal marshes have kept pace with the slow rate of sea level rise that has characterized the last several thousand years. Thus, the area of marsh has
expanded over time as new lands were inundated. If, in the future,
sea level rises faster than the ability of the marsh to keep pace, the
marsh area will contract. Construction of bulkheads to protect economic development may prevent new marsh from forming and result
in a total loss of marsh in some areas.

GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE: A CHALLENaE FOR THIS GENERATION (M.C.

Barth & J.G. Titus eds. 1984); Kearney & Stevenson, Sea Level Rise and Marsh Vertical
Accretion Rates in Chesapeake Bay, in COASTAL ZONE '85 (O.T. Magoon, et aL eds. 1985);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESPONDING TO SEA LEVEL (1987).
7. This figure is taken from Titus, Greenhouse Effect, Sea Level Rise, and Coastal
Zone Management, 14 COASTAL ZONE MGMT J. 147, 157 (1986).
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coastal wetlands can retreat with a moving shoreline if there is vacant
upland. However, in many places along the United States coast,
property owners have developed the area needed to support new
"migrant" wetlands into uses that require dry land. To protect their
investments, landowners may erect bulkheads to keep the rising waters out. As Figure 1 (D) shows, bulkheads create walls that will
prevent wetlands from migrating. Restrictions on the development of
existing coastal marshes will fail to achieve long-term wetland protection if sea levels rise and landowners upland of the marshes build
bulkheads. Policies that discourage or forbid landowners from erecting
seawalls will reduce the amount of wetlands loss.' The central tension between the interests of landowners to maintain the dry character
of their upland and the interests of the public to maintain a vegetated
margin between sea and land will strain regulatory agencies and the
courts.
This central tension can be viewed through the lens developed
by Professor Michelman more than two decades ago. 9 In
Michelman's analysis, just compensation of landowners focuses on the
disruption of the security of property interests." A private landowner
just upland of an existing marsh may experience some demoralization
from dashed expectations about what actions she may take as the tide
encroaches on her land. The case for compensation of economic loss
from a bulkhead prohibition, however, is weakened if the landowner
has early warning to adjust future expectations before they crystallize.
Professor Sax's treatment of the public trust doctrine complements

8. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that even if no bulkheads were built
to protect dry upland, a 50 cm rise in sea level would result in a 17-43% loss of coastal
wetlands. The same rise would result in a 38-61%' loss of wetlands if all dryland were
protected by bulkheads. US. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 3 (For a 100
cm rise in sea level, coastal wetland loss is estimated at 26-66% if no bulkheads exist and
50-82% if bulkheads are built.). These estimates of area of wetlands loss are deceptive in
that many of the functions served by coastal marshes depend on shoreline length of wetland
rather than area. For fisheries in particular, small differences in area lost could result in
drastic ecological changes if the differences are accounted for by complete loss of shoreline
coverage in some regions. Titus, Greenhouse Effect and Coastal Wetland Polices: How
Americans Could Abandon an Area the Size of Massachusetts at Minimum Cost, 15 ENVTL

MGMT 39 (Jan./Feb. 1991) [hereinafter Titus]. See M.V. REID & M.C. TRExLER, DROWNING
THE NATIONAL HERITAGE

CIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. COASTAL BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

(1991) (describing the adverse effects of sea level rise on coastal ecology).
9. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of

"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 1 have adopted Michelman's
terminology in the language that follows.
10. Id. at 1166-68.
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this perspective by focusing on preventing destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common." These expectations generally
include the right to enjoy the coast and the environmental benefits it
sustains. Passage must be cleared for the geographic movements of
coastal wetlands induced by global warming if the public rights to
marsh use are to be maintained.
This article grapples with one of the most vexing results of
climate change by examining the law embodied in these public and
private perspectives of expectations: (1) just compensation, as required
by the fifth amendment and (2) the public trust doctrine. Part I reviews possible policy approaches to address the wetlands migration
problem. An effective government response will account for the uncertainty and take advantage of the advance warning of sea level rise.
The next two parts consider strategies to restrict private bulkheading
that are economically efficient, not costly to the government and raise
serious legal concerns. Part II discusses the implications of shoreline
changes for the public trust doctrine. The public trust may allow or
even impose a duty on governments to act to facilitate wetlands migration. Part ImI applies takings law and lays out the fifth amendment
boundaries for restricting bulkheads without compensation. The application of these two areas of law to the problem of coastal wetlands
protection and sea level rise highlights the challenges to traditional
property interests that global climate change will bring.
The article concludes by returning to the central tension between
concentrated private expectations and diffuse public expectations.
Concern over the continuing viability of coastal ecosystems is only
one of many policy problems that will press the government, including the courts, to balance fairly competing interests. Global warming
will stretch conventional notions of stability and natural change. The
climate change debate continues to flourish in scientific journals, but
enough is understood to call for an early response from government.
Indeed, an early response will help clarify the expectations that are at
the heart of property law. In the case of coastal wetland protection,
early action will result in more marsh migration at less cost with the
least disruption of settled property interests.

11. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 185, 188 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Liberating]; See also, Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L REV. 471
(1970) (presenting an overview of the public trust doctrine); See also, Say, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE W. 149 (1971) [hereinafter Sax, Takings].
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POLICY OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING "MIGRANT"
WETLANDS

The probability of global warming over the next century and the
resultant rise in sea levels present policy-makers and coastal managers
with a novel problem.12 Instead of preserving an existing wetland
that faces an imminent threat, these decision-makers must now contemplate protecting a potential new wetland from a future threat. The
characteristic uncertainty and remoteness in time of events that will
affect the viability of coastal wetlands during sea level rise 13 may
require unconventional responses.14
In an article describing the policy problem, the Environmental
Protection Agency's James Titus characterizes three approaches to
facilitate coastal wetland migration: (1) prevent development; (2) do
nothing now; or (3) condition development on an agreement not to
protect the property from rising seas."5 The first category consists of
policies to prevent development in areas likely to be inundated. This
can be accomplished through the purchase of property rights or regulation.16 If the government is able to prevent development on uplands adjacent to coastal wetlands, then there will be little incentive

12. The nascent legal literature on issues related to climate change centers on international implications. See, e.g., Caron, Wten Law Makes Climate Change Worse: Rethinking the
Law of Baselines in Light of a Rising Sea Level, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 741 (1990); Lang, Is the
Ozone Depletion Regime a Model for an Emerging Regime on Global Warming?, 9 UCIA J.
ENVTL L. & PoL'Y 161 (1991); Menefee, "HalfSeas Over": The Impact of Sea Level Rise
on InternationalLaw & Policy, 9 UClA J. ENvL L. & POL'Y 175 (1991); Stone, The
Global Warming Crisis, If There Is One, and the Law, 5 AM. UJ. INT'L L & POL'Y 497
(1990); Zaelke & Cameron, Global Warming and Climate Change - An Overview of the
InternationalLegal Process, 5 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249 (1990).
13. In some parts of the United States, relative sea level rise due to subsidence, reduction of sedimentation, or erosion makes the problem of coastal wetland migration considerably
more certain and immediate. For example, Louisiana, which has one third of all the coastal
wetlands in the lower 48 states, is losing its coastal marshes at a rate of 25,000 acres per
year. The loss is due to a variety of factors, including subsidence from extraction of oil, gas
and groundwater; tectonic subsidence; and channelization and dredging of the Mississippi
River by the Army Corps of Engineers. Tiner, supra note 2, at 37-38; R. CHABRECK, COASTAL MARSHES: ECOLOGY AND WILDuFE MANAGEMENT 69-71 (1988); Dean, In Louisiana, a
Critical Wetland Habitat Founders, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1990, at C1, col. 1.
14. In addition to the thoughtful articles by Sax and Titus, supra note 8, domestic
policy responses to sea level rise are discussed in: Ausubel, A Second Look at the Impacts of
Climate Change, 79 A. SCIENTIST 210 (1991); NAIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING (1991); M.V. REID & M.C. TREXLER, supra note 8.
15. See Titus, supra note 8, at 44. See also Sax, The Fate of Wetlands in the Face of
Rising Sea Levels: A Strategic Proposal, 9 UCLA J. ENVrL L. & POL'Y 143 (1991) [hereinafter Sax, The Fate] for an engaging discussion of the policy issues.
16. See Titus, supra note 8, at 44.
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for the owner to protect his investment by constructing a bulkhead as
the sea level rises. A regulatory scheme that forbids development,
however, may be both financially and politically costly to governments. The financial costs may be shifted to the government if the
courts require compensation for the lost value of the property. If the
government is not required to compensate affected landowners, the
political costs to officials of decisions that reduce the value of
constituents' property are likely to be high. This is particularly true in
the case of coastal wetlands protection where the burdens are borne
by a small group of citizens and the benefits are diffused throughout
society.
Moreover, developed residential use of fastland before inundation
would do little harm to subsequent migration.' Prohibiting current
economic use of uplands results in a loss of whatever value would be
created by development, with little benefit to future wetlands. 8 Another weakness of the development ban strategy is that it does nothing to allow wetlands migration in areas with existing upland development.' 9
Governments often do nothing until a crisis motivates action. The
second category of responses allows development on private property
without intervention now, but requires abandonment when wetlands
begin to encroach. 20 However, the "do nothing now" strategy merely
postpones the difficult political and financial decisions surrounding
coastal wetlands viability. The longer governments wait, the more
development will occur and the greater stake landowners will have in
protecting property with bulkheads. The "do nothing now" approach
is, in essence, a gamble against the odds that the Earth's climate will
warm.
The third strategy, to allow development on the condition that
property will not be protected from rising seas, is the most reasonable
from an economic perspective.' Titus proposes two methods for

17. Most residential development, if abandoned when inundated, would decay and not
impede the migration of wetlands. At some level of intensity, however, durable structures and
the pollution associated with development might create problems for migration. Titus, supra
note 8, at 55.
18. See id. at 57.

19. Approximately one seventh of the east and gulf coasts are developed. Titus, et aL,
Greenhouse Effect and Sea Level Rise: Potential Loss of Land and the Cost of Holding Back
the Sea, 19 COASTAL MGMT. 171, 186 (1991). The author has found no estimate of the
proportion of this developed area that lies directly above coastal wetlands.

20. See Titus, supra note 8, at 44.
21. See id. at 50-51.
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implementing this approach: (1) ban bulkheads or (2) purchase future
interests.? Prohibiting bulkheads would allow fastland property owners to develop their property to whatever degree they wished, subject
to the condition that any such development will not block wetland
migration.? Government action today to prohibit bulkheads in the
future has a low political and financial cost because there is not an
imminent threat of inundation and because future interests are discounted. However, regulatory prohibition of bulkheads that is politically acceptable today may falter in the future as flooding occurs and
landowners lobby to protect their property from an imminent

threat.24 Therefore, government may wish to take advantage of discounted future property interests by purchasing them instead of imposing a regulatory prohibition, because the acquired interests may be
more durable as the threat of flooding becomes more imminent.
The legal issues associated with the types of responses to sea
level rise vary greatly in their complexity.' The responses that in-

22. See id. at 44-45.
23. In this article, the term "bulkhead" refers to any structure blocking wetlands migration regardless of whether the structure serves some other purpose.
24. See Sax, The Fate, supra note 15 for a discussion of prohibitions. When Hurricane
Hugo slammed into South Carolina in October 1989, it transformed a future threat of coastal
storm damage into an immediate one. The hurricane halted implementation of the 1988
Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-270, which prohibited new construction or replacement of destroyed buildings in a "dead zone" twenty feet back from the
primary dune. The law would have prevented rebuilding on approximately 20 of the 150
properties damaged by the hurricane and was already bobbled by about 45 takings challenges
to the application of the construction prohibitions seaward of the primary dune. The state
legislature amended the law in June, 1990 to eliminate the "dead zone" prohibitions and
allow for variances under certain circumstances. The 1990 amendments also implemented a
version of the third response strategy by prohibiting new bulkhead construction, bulkhead
strengthening and bulkhead rebuilding. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(B)(2). See Esposito v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting temporary takings
challenge to the 1988 law).
Maine regulations implementing its coastal construction permit system attempt to
accommodate sea level changes by prohibiting construction that may reasonably be expected
to experience damage from shoreline changes within 100 years. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 480-B; Code of Maine Rules, Ch. 355, § 3(A)(2). Furthermore, "if the shoreline recedes
such that the coastal wetland . . . extends to any part of the structure, including support
posts, for a period of six months or more," then the structure must be relocated. Id. §
3(B)(1)(b). Because the Maine coast has so little marsh area, there are few affected landowners.
See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text for a description of the legislative
response in Mississippi to overturn the results of an expansive judicial interpretation of public
ownership of tidelands.
25. Of the seven options that Titus lays out, one (number 5, rely on elcments/economics) involves no increased regulation or acquisition of property. Titus, supra note
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corporate compensation to property owners face no legal hurdles. The
power of eminent domain, which rests both in the federal and state
governments, allows condemnation of private property for a public
purpose. Wetlands protection is a legitimate public purpose.2 Governments can negotiate a voluntary sale or compel sales through condemnation procedures.
If, however, the government opts to prohibit development of
bulkheads through legislation or regulation, then the primary legal
question is whether it is required to compensate affected property
owners. Even though political considerations may warrant that coastal
landowners be compensated for losses they suffer while facilitating
wetland migration, the question is still important because if the government is not legally required to make that compensation, its negotiating position will be stronger. The stronger the government's right to
act without compensation, the more likely private landowners are to
cooperate, and the lower their reservation prices will be. The public
trust doctrine, along with the law of nuisance, defines the existing
public rights that limit certain uses of private property. If bulkheads
or development are incompatible with the exercise of these public
rights, then no compensation is required for regulatory restrictions.

Takings law sets the limits of governments' ability to interfere with
private property for public purposes without just compensation.?V

8 at 44. The only possible legal issue involved in this laissez-faire option is the fiduciary
duty of the public trust doctrine discussed infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. Three
options (number 2, buy coastal land now; number 4, buy property when seas rise; and
number 7, leases) involve either voluntary negotiation or forced sale. See id. The principal
legal concern with these options is the relevant authority's power of eminent domain. See
infra note 26 and accompanying text. The lease option can be implemented by governments
through purchase (or condemnation) of the fee simple absolute property and then lease-back
of property for a term of years. See Titus, supra note 8 at 45. Titus' alternative option of
"converting" fee simple absolute ownership to a leasehold would certainly result in a taking
unless compensation were provided. The remaining two options (number 1, prohibit development and number 6, prohibit bulkheads) raise the question of whether these restrictions can
be implemented without compensation to property owners. See id. at 44-45. Parts II and III
of this article focus on this issue.
26. Wetland protection falls comfortably within the bounds the Supreme Court has
established to limit what constitutes a public purpose. See United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding Army Corps' authority to require a permit to
fill in a wetland). Cf Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (upholding condemnations to
redevelop blighted urban areas as within the broad state power to act on behalf of the public
welfare).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V (No person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.'); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (No state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.').
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The following two parts of this article will focus on these legal
issues that surround restrictions on bulkhead construction. An analysis
of bulkhead prohibitions serves as a vehicle to explore how property
law will respond to climate change. It also describes the specific legal
problems that arise in implementing policies to protect coastal
wetlands as sea levels rise. This article applies the law to bulkhead
prohibition for four reasons: (1) it is a realistic example of the kind
of controversy that will arise from climate change which will press
the boundaries of conventional property law; (2) it is a farsighted
approach that alters expectations of property owners well before inundation and the need for a bulkhead is imminent; (3) it is an efficient
and politically feasible response to the problem of potential
wetland loss due to sea level rise; and (4) of all the possible responses to the threat of coastal wetland loss, it sits most squarely in the
gray area between permissible and impermissible regulation without
compensation, and therefore is a sensitive indicator of how far the
law will allow governments and agencies to go.

II. THE PuBuc TRUST DocTRINE
The public trust concerns the extent of the generally inalienable
common rights of the public to use or enjoy certain natural resources.
All property owners control land subject to the public trust. Because
coastal wetlands are valuable natural resources in which the public
has an inherent substantial interest,' a government may be able to
act within its trust responsibilities to address sea level rise. The public
trust authority of government, though, is much narrower than its
police power to protect the health and welfare of its citizens.
The law recognizes the coastline as a uniquely important location
and grants the government special rights and responsibilities in coastal
areas to act in the public interest. Navigation, commerce, and fisheries
are traditional areas of public interest; however, conservation and
aesthetics are gaining increasing recognition as elements of the public
trust. Yet, there is no single public trust theory; different trusts operate for different resources and different sovereigns (state and federal).
State and federal public trust doctrines are relevant to considering
responses to sea level rise because the coast is an area where private

28. See discussion of South Carolina and Maine law, supra note 24.
29. Important wetland functions include flood control; habitat for fishing, hunting, and
recreation; and sediment, erosion, and pollution control. J. KUSLER, supra note 1, at 1-7.
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lands traditionally have been subject to public rights. The protection
of these public rights may even impose an affirmative duty on governments.
A.

FederalPublic Trust: The Navigational
Servitude

The commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution impresses a servitude on all navigable waters. 30 To ensure unimpeded commerce, navigation, and fishing, the federal government can improve both inland
and coastal waters by building dams, jetties, diversions and other
structures. 31 A federal action that alters access to waters subject to
the navigational servitude does not require compensation even if the
alteration completely deprives a littoral owner of all access to the
waters. This is because the owner's title never encompassed a perpetual right to access navigational waters 2 Even when the government
condemns fastlands for a water-related project, compensation to the
owner does not include the value of those lands, such as for a port,
attributable to their location near the water.33
The commerce clause, besides defining the scope of the federal
navigational servitude, also defines Congressional regulatory authority
over navigable waters. This regulatory authority is broader than the
navigational servitude -4 and its exercise by Congress may sometimes
require compensation under the fifth amendment. 35 For instance, in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Court ruled that a non-navigable
private fish pond, when dredged and connected to the ocean to create

30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3; See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 96, 99
(1866) (holding that "[the] power to regulate commerce comprehends the control . . . of all

navigable waters.'9.
31. See Gilman, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 99.

32. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1987); United States v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
33. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967) (holding that the value of a riparian
owner's rights of access to navigable waters is not compensable under the fifth amendment).
34. In fact, Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce is much broader than the
federal navigational servitude. Not only can Congress regulate waters that are non-navigable,
but it can also regulate virtually any class of economic activities that cumulatively affect
interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding regulation of a
farmer's production of wheat for his family's consumption); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941) (upholding exclusion of certain goods manufactured by factories violating labor
standards from interstate commerce).
35. See infra notes 83-137 and accompanying text for an analysis of when the compensation requirement is triggered.
36. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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a marina, was subject to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' regulatory authority. However, the pond was not subject to the federal navigational servitude, which would have required free public access to
the marina without compensation to the owner.37
The federal government could use the navigational servitude to
prohibit a littoral landowner from erecting a bulkhead in navigable
waters below the high tide line. No compensation would be required.
The federal government could also use its broader commerce clause
regulatory authority to ban fastland bulkheads; however, it would be
required to compensate the landowner if the regulation resulted in a
taking. As seas rise, there is no doubt about the federal government's
ability to ensure that coastal wetlands be allowed to migrate. The
difficult question is whether the federal government could exercise its
public trust authority to prohibit bulkheads just above the current high
tide line without being subject to takings limitations.' Would courts
hold that the navigational servitude migrates inland as the seas rise?
Courts could decide the issue either way but most likely will
favor owners of fastland. Kaiser Aetna and its companion case,
Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp.,39 indicate that the U.S. Supreme Court
will focus on past use of areas that become subject to the ebb and
flow of the tides as a result of private construction. In both cases, a
landowner altered property that was not navigable to make it navigable for private use. In both cases the court held that such improvements, which neither divert nor destroy pre-existing waterways, do not
result in the extension of the federal navigational servitude to cover
the new navigable waters.'
These cases support the principle that property not previously
subject to the navigational servitude will remain free of the servitude
even if artificial construction exposes the property to the ebb and
flow of the tides. Since construction of a bulkhead will prevent land
from becoming subject to the ebb and flow of the rising tides, the
land will remain free from the servitude. It is hard to see how a
court that does not recognize the migration of the federal navigational
servitude to an area that becomes navigable-in-fact would extend the

37. Id. at 178-80.
38. A landowner who delays building a bulkhead and finds her property partly under
water during high tide may lose the right to exclude the sea from that area. See supra notes
10-11 and accompanying text. The following discussion concerns the situation where a
landowner builds a bulkhead before the property is inundated.
39. 444 U.S. 206 (1979)
40. Id. at 208-09; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180.
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public trust to an area that is kept dry by a seawall.
On the other hand, Kaiser Aetna and Vaughn can be read to
support the public policy of promoting enhancement of navigational
waters. If the court had found that the navigational servitude had
moved in these cases, property owners would be discouraged from
expanding navigable waters because they could not capture the benefits. In a sea level rise scenario, it is the prevention of construction
that will improve navigational waters. In Kaiser Aetna and Vaughn,
inaction would not have resulted in an expansion of navigable waters.
The Court did not wish to penalize enterprising landowners who
expand navigable waters through construction. Where inaction will
result in rising sea levels enhancing navigational waters, however, the
court may find that the servitude moves regardless of construction
activities. In a sense, this interpretation of the reach of the navigational servitude is tied to the "natural" reach of navigable waters in the
absence of construction. Under this theory, a landowner should not be
able to frustrate the reach of the navigational servitude by erecting a
bulkhead. As I discuss in the next section, however, climate change
will challenge legal theories based on naturalness. The Vaughn opinion left open the question of whether diversion or destruction of a
pre-existing natural waterway in the course of construction would
result in extending the servitude to the new navigable area created at
the "expense" of part of the public servitude.4' If harm to navigable
waters extends the servitude, then bulkheading that results in the
destruction of navigable waters (including wetlands) may be subject to
the public trust.
B. State Public Trust
As inheritors of the sovereign rights of the Crown, the thirteen
original states acquired ownership of all lands subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide. The "equal footing" doctrine gives all other states
the same rights as the original thirteen. 42 Therefore, upon statehood,
each state received title to lands subject to the ebb and flow up to
the normal high tide mark.43
41. 444 U.S. at 209-10 (remanding to the fact-finding court the question of whether
existing navigable waters were destroyed or diverted). The parties settled before the question
was decided.
42. Pollard's Lesee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845).
43. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). By extension of the English law doctrine,
states also received title to beds underlying navigable waters not subject to the tide. The
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852).
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States may own submerged tidelands regardless of their navigability.' However, "individual states have the authority to define the

limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights
in such lands as they see fit."' Nonetheless, all submerged tidelands, whether publicly or privately owned, are subject to certain

public easements.

6 Whereas

the federal public trust is primarily con-

cerned with navigational issues, the state public trust is more expansive and is concerned with a wide variety of interests including fishing, environmental quality, and recreation.' Therefore, state doc-

trines are more helpful in protecting the public interest in wetlands
preservation than is the federal doctrine. State public trust is not a
single doctrine, but fifty bodies of law created by each state.4

Mississippi's public trust in submerged lands, confirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,41 pres-

44. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (holding that the state
public trust applies to all submerged lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide).
45. Id at 475.

46. See, eg., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 169-73 (Me. 1989) (holding that
intertidal landowners hold title in fee subject to certain public easements); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 593-94, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913) (stating that private ownership is
subject to a paramount right to use by the public). Maine's severe restrictions on coastal
development had been upheld in Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d 453 (Me.
1987).
47. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 476 (stating that "several of our prior
decisions have recognized that the States have interests in lands beneath tidal waters which
have nothing to do with navigation.). See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d
374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, (1971).
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses
of the tidelands - a use encompassed within the tidelands trust - is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological
units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and
climate of the area.
Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
48. Generally, though, state public trust lands extend from the mean high tide line
(otherwise known as the mean high water mark) seaward to the three mile territorial limit.
This public trust land includes tidelands (otherwise known as foreshore) from mean high tide
to mean low tide and submerged lands seaward of the low tide. Existing coastal wetlands
generally occur in tidelands. See Comment, Public Access to Private Beaches: A Tidal

Necessity, 6 UCLA J.ENvm. L. & POL'Y 69 (1986). In states such as Massachusetts, where
colonial grants included littoral property to the extreme low water mark with a public easement for fishing, fowling, and navigation, the State does not own intertidal flats but may act
to preserve the easement. Conners & Krumholz, Legal Status of Tidal Flats in Massachusetts,
in INTERTIDAL FLATS: THEIR VALUE AND LE.AL STATUS 35 (1990). See generally D. SLADE,

PUtTING THE PUBL1C TRUST DOCTRINB TO WORK (1990) (surveying state public trust cases).
49. 484 U.S. 469 (1988). See Huffman, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: A Hidden
Victory for Private Property?, 19 ENVTh. L REP. 10051 (1989); Kosloff, Phillips Petroleum
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ents a useful illustration of the doctrine because the state is located
on the Gulf of Mexico with extensive wetlands, and has a representative common law system (as contrasted with Louisiana's anomalous
civil law-influenced system). In Mississippi, the public has an interest
in public bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, environmental protection, and mineral development along the shore. Despite the fact
that Phillips Petroleum Co. had been paying property taxes on submerged lands for which it had recorded title, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the submerged lands (and their valuable mineral rights)
belonged to the state of Mississippi, which had never granted Phillips
Petroleum rights the company was claiming.5 1 Public trust interests
do not lapse merely because a state has not previously asserted them.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in Cinque Bambini Partnership
v. State,52- held that state public trust lands may be augmented by
natural inland expansion of the tidal influence.
If over decades, . .. the tides rise - that is, the mean high water
mark rises (and there is reason to believe this has happened and
may continue to happen) - the inward reach of the tidal influence
expands ....
[T]he new tidelands so affected accrete to the
trust.,3
On the other hand, artificially created water courses, inlets, mari-,
nas, and other non-natural alterations to private land do not cause
ownership to pass to the state public trust even though they become
subject to the ebb and flow of the tides.' This finding was not appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court with the other issues in Phillips
Petroleum.
In response to the Cinque Bambini and Phillips Petroleum rulings, the Mississippi legislature enacted a statute to fix permanently
the boundaries between public and private lands. 5s The act requires

Co. v. Mississippi: Is the Public Trust Becoming Synonymous with the Public Interest? 18
ENv . L REP. 10200 (1988).
50. Treuting v. Bridge and Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 632-33 (Miss. 1967); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-3 and 5(a) (Supp. 1985) (cited in Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State,
491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), aff d sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484

U.S. 469 (1988)).
51. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 484.
52. 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469 (1988).
53. Id. at 519-20.
54. Id. at 520.
55. Public Trust Tidelands Legislation, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 29-15-1 (Supp. 1989).
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the Secretary of State to prepare a map to mark trust land boundaries
that will not move with rising sea levels.m The Secretary of State
has challenged the constitutionality of the act based on a public trust
theory in litigation that is now pending before the Mississippi Supreme Court.
Regardless of the outcome of the Mississippi litigation, there is
no existing state law doctrine that addresses a public interest in lands
that lie below sea level but are not subject to the ebb and flow of the
tides due to bulkhead protection. Nonetheless, Phillips Petroleum
provides a clue as to how a Mississippi program to protect migrating
wetlands might fare in the courts. The Phillips Petroleum Court
stressed the importance of "honoring reasonable expectations in property interests.ss In that case, Mississippi's long-standing claim of
ownership of tidal lands made it unreasonable for Phillips Petroleum
to assume that it held title. The Cinque Bambini opinion should put
coastal owners on notice of the state's future interest in lands that
will become tidal. Mississippi may honor this expectation by prohibiting bulkheads. The unprecedented scale of sea level rise due to global
warming necessarily unsettles both public and private expectations.
Policy-makers should begin to institute programs to prohibit bulkheads
sooner rather than later so that new expectations have a chance to
settle before seas rise so high as to threaten imminently upland property.
To the extent that sea level rise caused by the global warming is
not a natural event, the state may not be entitled even to newly submerged land according to Cinque Bambini's artificially created waters
exception. 9 After all, global warming is a kind of nuisance caused
by human activities that generate "greenhouse gases." But unlike the
artificial changes in navigable waters in Vaughn, where a responsible
party is identifiable, the diffuse anthropogenic causes of global warming make allocation of responsibility for sea level rise difficult. Actually, the rate of sea level rise is a behavior more analogous to natural

56. Id. § 29-15-7 (Supp. 1989).
57. Byrd v. State, no. 17-879 (Chancery Ct, Harrison County Civ. April 18, 1990),

appeal docketed, Nos. 90TS-692 and 90TS-714 (Miss. Sup. Ct.). See also Rychlak, Thermal,
Expansion, Melting Glaciers, and Rising Tides: The Public Trust in Mississippi, 11 Miss.
C.L. REv 95 (1990) (Rychlak attributes passage of the 1989 law to political pressure from
coastal property owners).
58. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 482.
59. Cinque .Bambini Partnership,491 So. 2d at 520.
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changes along the coast, such as subsidence, than to artificial changes,
such as the construction of a marina or canal. Since sea level rise
will occur over the course of decades, it may be regarded by courts
as akin to natural change because of the gradual way the alteration to
the shoreline occurs. The decisive factor in sorting out the legal response to sea level rise may be the longstanding principle that boundaries between land and water are inherently transient.' An owner
near a body of water has always been on notice that property boundaries may change due to erosion, accretion, and reliction. Only sudden, avulsive changes in watercourses leave property boundaries unaffected. 6' In explaining this rule, at least one court has noted that the
underlying rationale is the pace of change.6 2 Sea level rise induced
by global warming would threaten coastal wetlands at a speed that
would provide upland owners with a period of time of similar duration to landowners experiencing conventional erosion, accretion, and
reliction to adjust their expectations.
C.

The Expanding State Public Trust

Since the 1970s, many courts and commentators have argued that
the public trust doctrines should reach beyond the federal navigational
servitude and state ownership of submerged lands to protect public
rights to certain natural resources incapable of or inappropriate for

private ownership.' Some courts view the public trust as a dynamic

60. See Rychlak, supra note 57.
61. See id. at 105-07.
62. Strom v. Sheldon, 12 Wash. App. 66, 527 P.2d 1382 (1974).
63. The seminal article that reinvigorated the public trust doctrine is Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV.
471 (1970). See also Sax, Liberating, supra note 11; Stevens, The Public Trust: A
Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L
REV. 195 (1980); Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE LJ. 762 (170). Criticizing the expansion of the public trust
doctrine at the expense of private property rights are Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause
Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at
Work, 3 FLA. J. LAND UsE & ENvrt L 171 (1987); Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L REv. 711 (1986).
The most widely cited court decision implementing the broader notions of the public
trust is National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658
P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (incorporating public
trust considerations into the existing state system of water rights by balancing reasonable,
beneficial uses of water with competing public interests such as environmental protection).
The California Court noted that the purpose of the public trust evolves in tandem with
changes in public uses and values. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of Water, 858 F.2d
1409 (9th Cir. 1988), for the latest case in the ongoing Mono Lake controversy.
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doctrine to "be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and
needs of the public it was created to benefit."' To the extent that
the public has a reasonable expectation to enjoy the benefits of coastal wetlands, the trust can ensure that those wetlands do not disappear
under the rising seas.
As the modem public trust doctrines evolve along with the problems posed by global warming, the reach of public rights may extend
to activities such as bulkheading that previously were unrestricted.
Such an evolution is consistent with an emerging trend. Whereas the
traditional public trust extended only up to the high water line and
was concerned solely with navigation, commerce, and fishing, recent
cases have expanded the trust to include dry sand areas of public
beaches for recreation.0 For example, in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,66 the New Jersey Supreme Court confirmed that

the public's right to use tidelands includes a variety of recreational
activities and found that the use of the dry sand beach above the high
water mark extending to the vegetation line was necessary to the

exercise of the public right.67 This ancillary right includes not only
the use of the dry sand beach for access to the tideland, but also "the

right to sunbathe and generally enjoy recreational activities."' The

64. Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 NJ. 296, 309, 294 A.2d 47, 54
(1972) (quoted in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355,
365 (1984), cert. denieA 469 US. 821 (1984)). See also Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251,
491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) ('The public uses to which tidelands are
subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs.'); Cinque Bambini
Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), affd sub noma.Phillips Petroleum
Co., 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (holding that the purposes of the public trust, including environmental protection and preservation, "evolved with the needs and sensitivities of the people and the capacity of trust properties through proper stewardship to serve those needs.')
65. See, e-g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 NJ. 306, 471 A.2d 355,
365 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). See also Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712,
336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (2d Dep't 1972), affd., 33 N.Y.2d 854 (1973) (confirming the
public's right to use the foreshore for bathing, lounging and reclining). Not all states share
an expansive view of the public trust. For instance, Massachusetts courts have defined public
rights to intertidal flats narrowly. The public may use the water but has no right to the land
underneath for bathing, collecting, or even walking. Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681,
686-89, 313 NE.2d 561 (1974). The Maine Supreme Court recently found unconstitutional the
Public Trust Intertidal Land Act, which declared an unlimited public right to use intertidal
land for recreation. Bell v. Town of Wells, 57 U.S.L.W. 2590 (Maine Sup. Jud. Ct. No.
5029 3/30/89) (holding that a legislative declaration that extended the public trust beyond the
traditional public easements for fishing, fowling, and navigation was a physical invasion of
property and therefore a taking).
66. 95 NJ. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984), cert. denied, 469 US. 821 (1984).
67. Matthews, 95 NJ. at 312, 471 A.2d at 358 n. 1.
68. Id. at 323, 471 A.2d at 364.
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court declared that this right of use exists on private as well as public
lands.' The New Jersey Supreme Court's willingness to recognize
public rights on private property to allow public enjoyment of existing trust lands illustrates the flexibility of the doctrine. This flexibility
holds promise for imposing public trust restrictions on fastlands located upland of existing coastal wetlands. The opinion reflects a practical attitude toward ensuring that the public trust be useable. Just as
the public right of recreation along a tideland is frustrated if the
public cannot use the adjacent dry sand beach, so the public's environmental and health interest in coastal wetlands will be frustrated if
upland owners erect bulkheads that block marsh migration. The
Matthews case demonstrates the willingness of a court to impose
obligations on fastlands so that traditional public trust areas can serve
their public purposes.
Wisconsin, in its celebrated opinion of Just v. Marinette County, recognized that "[t]he changing of wetlands and swamps to the
damage of the general public by upsetting the natural environment... is not a reasonable use of that land which is protected from
police power regulation." 7' In Just, a landowner was prevented from
filling his property because it might diminish the ability of the
wetlands to serve as a buffer for pollution. In applying the public
trust, the court stressed the close interrelationship between wetlands
and the integrity of navigable waters. The purpose of the ordinance
upheld in Just was to "protect navigable waters and the public rights
therein from the degradation and deterioration which results from
uncontrolled use and development of shorelands."t The same rationale may be applied to a regulation restricting bulkheading.
California has a similar ecological interest in its public trust
doctrine for tidelands. In Marks v. Whitney,' an action to quiet title
to settle a boundary line dispute, the California Supreme Court held
that the littoral owner holds property subject to a public easement for
navigation, commerce, and preservation. "[O]ne of the most important

69. Id. at 325, 471 A.2d at 365. The defendant in Matthews was a non-profit corporation that acted as a quasi-public association. The court's language regarding purely private dry
sand beaches is dictum.
70. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
71. Id. at 17-18, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
72. Id. at 10, 201 N.W. 2d at 765; see also M & I Marshall & lsley Bank v. Town
of Somers, 141 Wis. 2d 271, 414 N.W.2d 824 (1987) (reaffirming the vitality of Just and
stressing the public harm/public benefit test).
73. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
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public uses of the tidelands . . is the preservation of those lands in
their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological
units .... .'7 Explicit judicial recognition of this particular use of
the public trust suggests that a ban on bulkheads, if justified to preserve marsh ecology, may be acceptable in states like California and
Wisconsin.
It is important to recognize that there is a difference between
prohibiting development of a tract of land because of its existing
value as a wetland and prohibiting the erection of a sea wall because
of a tract of land's potential to evolve into a wetland. An owner is
on notice of the current natural character of her land, but not necessarily of its importance as a future wetland if the sea level rises. This
underscores the importance of a bulkhead prohibition that is implemented as soon as possible to allow ample time for reconciliation of
expectations with the risks of global warming.
D. Enforcing the Public Trust
This discussion of the public trust has focused on finding authority for willing state and federal governments to claim a public interest
in protecting migrating coastal wetlands. However, the public trust
sometimes is applied to compel a government to take or refrain from
an action.7 5 If the public trust is applicable to wetlands migration,
then there is precedent for a fiduciary duty of the government to act
to prevent interference with the process.
The classic case of this fiduciary aspect of the trust is Illinois
Central R.R. v. Illinois.76 In that case, the state of Illinois revoked a
grant it had made of a major section of the Chicago waterfront to the
railroad company. The U.S. Supreme Court held the original grant
invalid, stating that Illinois was powerless to alienate a natural resource as important as Chicago's harbor. 7 This principle may be

74. Id. at 259, 491 P. 2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
75. The trust may also be applied to compel a landowner to abate an action that causes
damage to public rights along the coast. Comment, supra note 63 (citing J. GOULD, A

§ 27 (1900)).
76. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
77. The Illinois legislature has run afoul of the public trust doctrine repeatedly for

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS

attempting to convey land under Lake Michigan. See Lake Michigan Fed'n v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F. Supp 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that the legislature had
improperly conveyed 18.5 acres of lakebed to Loyola University for park and athletic facilities); People ex. rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E. 2d 773 (1976)
(holding that the legislature may not convey 194.6 acres of lakebed to U.S. Steel Corp.).
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relevant to wetlands migration. If a state fails to restrict bulkheads, it
may be abdicating its fiduciary responsibility to protect tidal lands.
The migrating wetlands situation in which government fails to
act is different from Illinois Central, however, because there was an
identifiable action by the Illinois legislature to which conflict of interest or failure of duty could be attached. Still, courts have compelled
government authorities to act affirmatively on behalf of a public trust
resource. As with the line of New Jersey cases expanding the public
trust to include some interests on dry sand beaches, these fiduciary
cases represent the leading edge of public trust law As trends, they
give greater impetus to state and federal governments to create regulatory systems that can keep pace with new threats to public resources.
In a series of cases involving water diversion for the City of Los
Angeles, the California Supreme Court held that the public trust "is
an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of ... marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right
of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is
consistent with the purposes of the trust." 78 The Court held that the
city might have to reduce existing appropriative water rights to protect public trust values in Mono Lake. The city planned to increase
future diversions even though past use of Mono Lake tributaries had
reduced water levels to an extent that threatened habitat.
Another series of opinions, relating to U.S. Department of the
Interior management of Redwood National Park,' found that the
department's inaction violated its fiduciary responsibilities to protect
the park. The Court required the department to fulfill its trust by
lobbying Congress for an expansion of park boundaries, and ordered
the department to report back to the court on proposals made for
more park protection, more management authority, more money to
purchase land and more negotiation of cooperative agreements with
neighboring timber companies (whose practices were causing erosion
and sedimentation).

78. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 724, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, 360-01 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). Other states have recognized the exception to the rule against alienation of the public trust in the event the transfer
is for a public purpose. See, eg., City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820
(1927) (upholding Milwaukee's grant to a steel company to develop a public harbor).
79. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976), 398 F.
Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See Wilkinson, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVtS L REV. 269 (1980) (providing an
insightful analysis of these cases).
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More recently, a different federal court suggested that the U.S.
Department of Agriculture staff failed to act "with the degree of
responsibility rightfully expected of them" when they did not assert
federal reserved wilderness water rights in state stream adjudications.' The court concluded that it lacked the discretion to require
that the Department assert federally reserved wilderness water
rights.' However, the court ordered the Department staff to write "a
memorandum explaining their analysis, final decision, and plan to
comply with their statutory obligations regarding protection and preservation of wilderness water resources."' Although the Tenth Circuit
vacated the lower court's judgment on ripeness and reviewability
grounds, the opinions that address the merits of the public trust issue
reflect the potential for citizen enforcement. Just as a landowner has
recourse in the courts for frustration of certain private expectations, so
does the public for its trust interests. However, if the hurdles of ripeness and reviewability prevent citizens from compelling agencies to
act to protect coastal wetlands until flooding is imminent, the public
will have lost a crucial opportunity to confirm its interest before
private interests crystallize and the equities shift.
III.

THE TAKINGS ISSUE

In his famous 1922 opinion, Justice Holmes found that a Pennsylvania law restricting underground coal owners from mining some
of their property was invalid without compensation to the owners for
loss of their rights.' He stated: "if [a] regulation goes too far, it
will be recognized as a taking."' Although subsequent cases give us
80. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 865 (D. Colo. 1985); Sierra Club v. Lyng,
661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987), vacated, Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th
Cir. 1990) (finding agency action unreviewable and case unripe).
81. Block 622 F. Supp. at 865. This conclusion is in line with earlier cases involving
nonassertion of federal reserved water rights. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443
(D.D.C. 1980), affd. sub. nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that Interior's failure to assert federal reserved water rights had a rational basis because none
of the relevant energy developers had acquired vested water rights and the ultimate relief
sought was being obtained through other administrative means).
82. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp at 865 (agreeing that a two-page plan submitted
in response to the Court's order exhibited no real analysis and ordering preparation of a new
one); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987), vacated on other grounds,
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990).
83. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
84. Id. at 415 (finding that application of a state statute that substantially furthered an
important public policy constituted a taking because it so frustrated investment-backed expectations). Cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss3/2

22

Fischman: Global Warming and Property Interests: Preserving Coastal Wetland

1991]

PRESERVING COASTAL WRTLANDS

more guidance, Holmes' general statement accurately captures the ad
hoc law of takings85 - there is no precise formula for determining
whether a regulation, such as a bulkhead or development restriction,
will lead to the taking of private property by its application.' Courts
seldom invalidate a regulation as unconstitutional on its face.'
States, which have sovereign power to regulate land use for the
health, safety and welfare of their citizens, confer regulatory authority
on local governments to control land use. Many state governments
reserve authority to regulate land use directly in areas of special
concern, such as coasts. Both state regulations and local ordinances
based on enabling authority granted from the state must respect fifth
amendment protections of property.' However, it is important to
note that a landowner can challenge a local regulation as not being
within the scope of powers granted to the local jurisdiction by state
law. This issue is a matter of state law and does not arise in cases
where the state directly regulates land use, such as actions by a state
coastal zone management authority.
This analysis begins with a review of the constitutional law of
takings and applies the doctrine to regulatory authority to prohibit
construction of bulkheads. Next, it addresses the special case of conditioning building permits on agreements not to build bulkheads. The
public trust doctrine protects public expectations by providing authority, and perhaps a duty, for government to act, whereas takings law
protects the expectations of property owners by restricting the power
of governments to regulate without compensation.

85. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)

(stating that the Court will focus on the particular circumstances of an application of a
challenged public action).
86. A regulation also will be invalid if it deprives a landowner of property without due
process of law. Because the due process protection in the fifth amendment embodies similar
safeguards as the just compensation requirement, courts generally fail to distinguish between
the two grounds when overturning regulations. Want, The Taking Defense to Wdlands Regulation, 14 ENva. L REP. 10169 (1984). Therefore, the takings issue as defined in this paper
includes substantive due process concerns that tend to focus on the rational relationship
between the regulation in question and a legitimate government interest (e.g., a state's interest
in health, safety and welfare of its citizens).
87. See, e-g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (emphasizing that takings analysis must be conducted with respect to specific property
and the values affected by the particular circumstances of the application of the law). See
also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
88. The fourteenth amendment extends the application of the fifth amendment to the
states. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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Takings Law and Anti-Bulkhead Regulation

It is impossible to convert into formula the narrative language of
U.S. Supreme Court opinions describing the limits of the fifth amendment just compensation requirement. Generally, however, the Court's
analysis tends to focus on three considerations:
1.
2.
3.

the extent to which the regulation advances a legitimate state
interest;
the extent to which the regulation denies all reasonable economic uses of the property; and
the extent to which the regulation is a physical invasion or
outright seizure of a property interest.8

The following sections address each of these possible triggers for
a taking.
1. Legitimate State Interest
The requirement that a regulation advance a legitimate state
interest technically precedes the takings analysis. However, for practical purposes, it is part and parcel of the Court's analysis of a takings
claim. 90 The consideration involves identifying a legitimate interest
and then showing the nexus between the regulation and the interest.91 If either a legitimate interest is lacking or the relationship between the state interest and the regulatory burden imposed on private
property is too attenuated in a given case, a taking (or substantive
due process violation) will result.
Although some state courts have found that preservation of land
in a natural state is a valid state interest, 92 most courts look for interests that are more explicitly tied to human concerns. To the extent
that coastal wetlands migration is important for fish spawning, for

89. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
90. See id. at 127 (stating that "a use restriction on real property may constitute a
'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose"); See
also Agins v. Tiberon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (a law is "a taking if the ordinance does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests').
91. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 438 US. at 130.
92. See Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327 (S.C. 1984) (upholding restrictions on filling wetlands); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 24, 201 N.W.2d
761, 771 (1972) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting a landowner from filling a wetland and
stating that "[tihe ordinance ... preserves nature from the despoilage and harm resulting
from the unrestricted activities of humans.').
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instance, a regulation advancing this interest is more likely to be
upheld if it is based on maintaining fisheries (for humans) rather than
merely protecting fish.93 Protection of non-economic resources such
as wildlife or aesthetics arouses more judicial scrutiny. Any legislative
(or even administrative) finding that migration of coastal wetlands is
in the interest of human health, safety or welfare will help boost a
regulation over the legitimate state interest hurdle. Such a finding can
also be important to help demonstrate the nexus between the regulatory burden and the public interest advanced.
Still, the legitimate interests that may be served by regulation are
broad and comfortably encompass the purposes of prohibiting bulkheads. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld regulations designed to
preserve open space, avoid premature development, prevent pollution
and congestion;9' protect wetlands; 95 maintain aesthetics;' and reclaim disturbed land.97 If, however, a court suspects that the underlying purpose of an otherwise legitimate regulation is to reduce the
value of property to make future public acquisition less costly, then it
may view the application of the regulation as a taking.' Bulkhead
prohibitions cannot be imposed in order to make purchase of flowage
easements or other property interests less costly.
2. Economic Impact
Regulations may have significant adverse effects on the market
value of property, but as long as they do not remove all reasonable
economic uses of land, they may not constitute a taking. Sometimes
the courts will view the economic consideration as having two facets:
the direct impact on the landowner, and the extent of interference
with investment-backed expectation. 9 However, the distinctions be93. Public expense for maintenance of fisheries may be avoided by maintaining
wetlands. See Moskow v. Commissioner of Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 384 Mass. 530, 427 N.E.
2d 750 (1981) (holding that a restrictive order issued pursuant to the Inland Wetlands Act
was not a taking because the Act is reasonably related to the goals of flood and pollution
control and the interference was not too extensive).

94. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upholding a zoning ordinance
limiting the number of buildings a plaintiff could construct on his property and deferring to
legislative findings).
95. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding
wetlands protection regulation under the federal Clean Water Act).

96. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
97. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(upholding specific provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act).
98. See e.g., cases cited in Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 46

(1964).
99. See, eg., Connolly v. Pension Benefits Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225-26 (1986)
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tween the two blur because the direct impact often coincides with
frustration of expectation. 1 0 In examining the value left in property
after regulation, courts adjudicating taking disputes often weigh the
importance of the public benefits created by the regulation. Moreover,
even if a prohibition of a land use results in a complete loss of economic value, courts will not find a taking if allowing the use would
cause a public nuisance. The economic impact hurdle comes closest
to the classic balancing test of public benefit versus private cost. It is
a pragmatic standard to be applied to the particular facts of a
case. 10 As a balancing test, the economic impact analysis offers the
flexibility necessary to respond to the new clashes in expectations that
climate change will instigate.
In Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York,' 2 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission's ruling that multistory office space
could not be built above the designated landmark of Grand Central
Terminal. The Court held that for the purposes of takings analysis, a
single parcel should not be divided into discrete segments to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.
ciding whether a particular governmental action has effected
ing, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the
[discussed in the next section] and on the nature and extent
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole."0 3

In dea takaction
of the

(in which the Court relied on three distinct factors of "particular significance" to determine
that imposition of withdrawal liability does not constitute a taking: economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and character of the action.
100. This is true in the Pennsylvania Central case discussed below. There the Court
found that the regulation did not interfere with Grand Central Terminal's present uses or
prevent Penn Central from realizing a "reasonable return" on its investment. 438 U.S. at 136.
See also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 168 (1990) ("In focusing on
the extent to which the government's action has denied plaintiff the economic viability of its
property the court may combine the first two of these factors (economic impact and invest.
meat-backed expectations.)'9. Expectations, however reasonable, may not be subject to the

fifth amendment if not investment-backed.
101. See Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence
of Takings, 88 COLUM. L REV. 1667, 1680-84 (1988) (contrasting standards with rules). But
see Michelman, supra note 9, at 1233 (arguing that the diminution in value test is not so
much a sliding-scale standard but rather a rule that measures "whether or not the measure in
question can easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant of some distinctly
perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.').
102. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
103. Id. at 130-31. See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 491, 498 (1987).
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Thus, even if one portion of an interest in property is forfeited, the
continued viability of other rights in the property bundle will prevent
a taking.' Although Grand Central Terminal's owner was denied
the ability to exploit fully the economic value of the property, it was
still left with a viable economic use of the property. 105 In other
cases, severe restrictions on land use have been upheld where the
only residual economic uses were agriculture, recreation or camping.1" The smaller the portion of the land affected, the less likely
the regulation is to be ruled a taking, even if it is quite restrictive.107 A bulkhead ban applied to a small plot of land that will be
inundated completely is much more vulnerable to a takings claim than
one applied to a large plot, a portion of which will remain dry even,
in the absence of a bulkhead.
In Pennsylvania Central, city law permitted the terminal owner
to transfer air development rights to nearby blocks. The Supreme
Court indicated that this option helped preserve the economic value of
the property.1°8 An anti-bulkhead policy will rest on firmer legal

104. This will generally not be true if a court finds a physical invasion, discussed in the
following section. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)
(holding that a public easement across a portion of the owner's property constitutes a compensable taking because it can be characterized as a "permanent physical occupation" of the
property); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982) (holding that constitutional protection of property does not depend on the size of the area affected
if it is physically occupied).
105. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 135-38.

106. Claridge v. State Wetlands Board, 125 N.H. 745, 485 A.2d 287 (1984) (camping
use for land is reasonable economic use); Turnpike Realty v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass.
221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973) (agriculture or recreation are
uses sufficient to surmount the takings hurdle); Turner v. DelNorte County, 24 Cal. App. 3d
311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1971) (recreational use sufficient).
The recent departures from this line of cases are Florida Rock Indus. v. United States,
21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990)
(holding that denials of FWPCA § 404 permits resulted in compensable takings by denying
owners economically viable uses of their property). In Florida Rock the Court found insufficient evidence of a "solid and adequate" market for the property without a FWPCA § 404
permit despite a number of written offers for purchase and the speculative investment present
in the area. In Loveladies Harbor, the Court was unmoved by the fact that only 5% of the
property was affected by the permit denial and that the claimant enjoyed a substantial economic gain from the 80% of the property that had been developed.
107. A regulation that affects a tiny portion of the property, however, may still be a
taking under one of the other two considerations. See supra note 38.
108. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 136. Nonetheless, the Supreme

Court has upheld regulations that result in a severe loss in value with no transferable development right compensation. See Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding
a regulation causing 75% diminution in value of property); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVEW

[Vol. 19".565

ground if regulatory authorities can offer fastland owners transferable
rights to offset the economic burden of a bulkhead ban. A transferable right might allow more intense development somewhere beyond
the highest expected future high tide line in exchange for an agreement not to construct a bulkhead. Alternatively, landowners along the
shore may be permitted to build at a higher density level on any
property that cannot be protected by a bulkhead. The danger with this
incentive, of course, is that higher density development may increase
the pressure on the government to retreat from its prohibitive policy
in the future, as more valuable structures are threatened with abandonment. 9 The effectiveness of transferable rights is, of course,
limited to situations where there is a target area with demand for
more intense development than is permitted by existing zoning.
When courts characterize a regulation as abating a public nuisance, rather than forcing a private landowner to provide a public
good, economic impact is substantially less important.1 A far
greater diminution in value is likely to be upheld if the regulation is
found to prevent a harm. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Just v.
Marinette County, framed its wetland preservation language in terms
of preventing harm ("despoliation") to public rights by limiting the
use of private property.' A recent interpretation of Just confirmed
that "the key to analyzing a claim that property has been taken ...
is the determination of whether the ordinance prohibits a public harm
or provides a public benefit.""' That Just is often cited as a case

394 (1915) (upholding a regulation causing 87.5% diminution in value); See also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
109. See Sax, The Fate, supra note 15.
110. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 492, n. 22 (holding that abatement of public nuisance to promote safety is not a taking even if it destroys the value of
property); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (finding that a slate prohibition on sale of
alcohol to protect public health and safety that ruined plaintiff's business is not a taking). See
also Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 661, 747 P.2d 1062, 1083 (1987) (citing
Keystone and Mugler).
111. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 16-17, 201 N.W.2d at 768 (stating that "[w]hat makes this case

different from most condemnation or police power zoning cases is the interrelationship of the
wetlands, the swamps and the natural environment of shorelands to the purity of the water
and to such natural resources as navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty.'); See also Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding an order by a state entomologist, acting pursuant to
a state statute, requiring landowners to cut down their cedar trees, which produced a disease
fatal to nearby apple trees); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a local
decision to ban a brickyard because of the nuisance it created to surrounding residences that
were erected while the brickyard was operating).
112. M & I Marshall & Isley Bank v. Town of Somers, 141 Wis. 2d 271, 287-88, 414
N.W.2d 824, 830 (1987).
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affirming the public trust doctrine highlights the close link between
the doctrine and the economic impact prong of takings analysis. If a
government regulation prevents an activity by a landowner that would
frustrate the public from exercising its rights, then the prohibited
activity should be characterized as a nuisance. Abatement of this kind
of nuisance will not be a taking because of economic impact even if
the property is rendered essentially worthless.
A well crafted bulkhead restriction will focus on the harm to
public interests that results from activities that cause marsh loss. In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,' the South Carolina
Supreme Court recently found that no taking occurred in implementing bulkhead and coastal construction restrictions because they were
designed to prevent public harm." 4 The Court relied on extensive
legislative findings that the coastal ecological and geomorphological
systems of the state were threatened by development that interferred
with natural processes.",5 Citing Keystone and Mugler, the Court
held that because restrictions were designed to prevent serious injury
to the community, no compensation was owed a property owner who
is prohibited from constructing any permanent structure (except a
small deck or walkway)." 6 The Court suggested that no amount of
economic impact would give rise7 to a taking where the government
acts to abate a public nuisance.'
Commentators often question the distinction between the abatement of a nuisance and the provision of a public good."' Without a
"benchmark of 'neutral' conduct which enables us to say where refusal to confer benefits ... slips into readiness to inflict harms,"" 9 it
is impossible to classify a bulkhead prohibition in either category.
From the perspective of private property interests, a bulkhead ban
enables the public to benefit from a new coastal wetland by compromising the landowner's ability to maintain the character of the plot of
land. From the perspective of public interests, bulkheading prevents

113. 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
114. Id. at 900.
115. Id. at 896-97.

116. Id. at 901.
117. Id. at 899-900. See also McNulty v. Town of Indiatlantic, 727 F. Supp. 604 (M.D.
Fla. 1989); Presbytery v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284

(1990) (both relying on Keystone to hold that, irrespective of the magnitude of the economic
loss to the landowner, construction restrictions on wetlands or coasts that prevent public harm
do not effect a taking).
118. See Michelman, supra note 9, at 1199, 1201; Sax, supra note 98, at 48-50.
119. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1197.
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continued use of the coastal wetlands and the larger areas they maintain with plants, fish, and water quality.
If the idea of preserving the natural character of land ever provided a stable benchmark,' 2 it will surely be cast adrift as sea levels rise. A court that views bulkheading as maintaining the nature of
the fastland against sea level rise produced by anthropogenic greenhouse gases is likely to regard bulkheading as a strong right held by
the landowner. On the other hand, a court that views bulkheading as
resistance to the natural phenomenon of marsh migration, for which
landowners have had ample notice, is likely to regard the construction
as depriving the public of its right to the benefits of coastal wetlands
which it has always enjoyed.
Yet, courts do draw the harm/benefit distinction. Such widely
cited cases as Miller v. Schoene, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n" manifest Michelman's rule that no
compensation is owed a landowner when prohibited activities would
have "either (a) interrupted someone else's enjoyment of an economic
good, as should have been apparent; or (b) were of a sort which
society had adequately made known should not become the object of
expectations of continuing enjoyment."" Failure to provide a benefit becomes a nuisance when society has given the property owner
ample warning of the benefits it expects."2 Certainly, Penn Central
had no duty to build Grand Central Terminal in the first place; however, as the building became admired as a landmark, the company
lost the right to alter it significantly. A court that upholds a regulation preventing alteration of a resource constructed by the owner (a
historic landmark) can reasonably uphold a regulation preventing
alteration of an ecological resource (e.g., a coastal wetland), even
though the owner was unaware of the need to maintain the resource
initially (when the terminal was built or the upland developed).
Governments that take action now to protect remaining marshes
indicate their intentions now to ensure that these ecosystems survive
sea level rise, and strengthen expectations to sustain the marine and
estuarine uses that depend on marshes. To the extent that a bulkhead
ban is the most narrowly drawn of the government's options to pro-

120. See, eg., Just 56 Wis. 2d at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768 (upholding zoning designed to

"prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses").
121. See supra notes 110-11.
122. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1241.
123. Public rights to use the coast are well established. See supra notes 63-82 and
accompanying text.
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tect coastal wetlands (as opposed to a development ban that prohibits
more than is necessary to allow future marsh migration), it may be
more likely seen as abating a nuisance by responding directly to a
new threat and not providing any new public benefits. A bulkhead

restriction justified on nuisance grounds may secure greater credibility
from a court if it is part of a larger program to remove any incen-

tives existing marsh owners have to alter the ecosystem. The economic cost of a bulkhead ban today will not be borne by the landowner
for decades, until the sea level rises sufficiently to threaten property.
The discounted value of the cost is likely to be small today. The
sooner a bulkhead ban is enacted, the less the cost to the landowner
and the greater the time available for adjustment of investment-backed
expectations. A bulkhead ban passing constitutional muster today
might fail if it were enacted at a later time when sea level rise is
imminent.'24
3. Character of Government Action
Where government regulation is of such a character as to physically invade or permanently occupy property, courts will find a taking
even if the economic loss is small."2 When a regulation creates a
new easement for public use, it is a taking. In KaiserAetna v. United
States,126 the Court ruled that the Army Corps of Engineers could

not prohibit, without compensation, a lagoon owner from excluding
the public. The Court stressed the fundamental nature of the right to
exclude others from private property and its violation by the imposition of the federal navigational servitude on a privately constructed

124. A bulkhead ban enacted today may also provide the government with an advantage

if the statute of limitations for filing a takings claim is triggered by the enactment. By the
time inundation occurs, landowners may be precluded from asserting a taking that actually
occurred decades ago. See Shostak & Barrett, Valid Edsting Rights on SMCRA, 5 J.MIN. L.

& PoL'Y 585, 618-19 (1989-90) (discussing the trigger for statute of limitations for taking
claims under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act).
125. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(holding that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by the government . . . ); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that "when the
physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has
occurred!). See also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (holding that an application of
federal law requiring any small undivided fractional interest in Indian land to escheat to the
tribe, rather than descend by intestacy or devise, resulted in a taking of decedents' property
rights in violation of the fifth amendment).
126. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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lagoon.'2 7 Public use of airspace for plane flights has been held to
constitute a taking of an air easement.' 2 In finding an easement
taking, the Court stressed the unanticipated nuisance of the intrusion
by low-flying aircraft. 29
The Court has also found a physical invasion even when the
government action implied no easement for public access. In Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,"0 the Court found a taking where a New York statute required apartment owners to allow
cable companies to install small electronic facilities on their premises
for a fee established by a commission. The character of the government action was determinative.' 3 ' The Court held that when the
character is a permanent physical occupation, there is a taking without
regard to whether the action furthers a legitimate state interest or has
only minimal economic impact on the owner. 32 The Loretto Court
did not consider, however, the case where a government action is a
permanent physical occupation but its purpose is to abate a public
nuisance. The cases discussed in the previous section of this article,
such as Miller v. Schoene,13 suggest that the state interest in preventing nuisance allows physical destruction without compensation.
Once a court finds that a regulation effects a physical invasion, it
is very likely that the regulation will be found to cause a taking
unless it abates a public nuisance. A regulation that is found to exact
a flowage easement for the sea over private property is more likely to
be considered a taking than one that is found merely to restrict a
seawall construction activity.134 The takings view would focus on
the permanent physical encroachment of water on the owners' property as a result of regulation. The permissible, non-compensatory regulation view would focus on the damage to public resources avoided
by restricting the harmful practice of building a bulkhead. It would
view a bulkhead prohibition not as imposing a flowage easement, but

127. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
128. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
129. Id.; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945).
130. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
131. Id. at 434.
132. Id. at 434-35.
133. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
134. See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (holding that a landowner whose
property was partially flooded because of a dam constructed by the federal government to
improve navigation is entitled to compensation in exchange for relinquishing a flowago
easement); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872)
(holding that the construction of a dam that flooded property effected a taking).
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rather as preventing a property owner from diverting a naturallyformed body of water off of her property.
The physical invasion rule yields results that are at odds with
instinctive notions of fairness. 3 5 A nominal harm will be compensable if it is the result of physical presence despite the fact that a greater harm will go uncompensated if it involves a mere use limitation
with no physical occupation.3 6 One basis for explaining the rule is
that private expectations about property use focus on a right to exclude people or objects; therefore, frustration of that expectation is
more serious than other forms of regulation. 137 The tension between
public and private expectations in this context will be manifest in the
conflict over whether the right to exclude includes the right to prevent changes in the nature of land that would replace one ecosystem
with another in which the public has an interest.
B. Permit Conditions
If a government can ban seawalls outright, it certainly can condition permits on agreements not to construct bulkheads. 138 However,
the political and legal hurdles are likely to be lower for conditioning
new building along the coast, where most development already is
regulated. Therefore, a coastal area that is not now highly developed
may wish to pursue this path of less resistance. Building permits for
new structures are issued by local authorities who may check to see
that the proposed structure meets zoning requirements. In many jurisdictions, special subdivision/land development ordinances regulate
major development activities and often require permit applicants to
meet standards relating to environmental protection. Building on unde-

135. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1226-29 (showing that the rule is also at odds with the
utilitarian justifications for takings law); Sax, supra note 98, at 46-48.
136. See Michelman, supra note 9, at 1226-29. See also Underkuffler, On Property: An
Essay, 100 YAI. LJ. 127 (1990) (describing the paradoxical results of legal formalism in

takings law).
137. See Radin, supra note 101, at 1680-84 (proposing that the basis for bright line rules
is a fear of uncontrollable, arbitrary decisions by judges).
138. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (indicating that
although a permit conditioned on an easement might be valid given a substantial relationship
to a state interest, an easement required by a blanket regulation would result in a taking:
"Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront
available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach,
rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we
have no doubt there would have been a taking."). Nonetheless, blanket regulation of land
uses that seem more severe than a bulkhead prohibition have been upheld by the Supreme
Court. See supra notes 108, 110.
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veloped land in -coastal zones often requires a permit from a state
coastal zone management agency.'39 Any of these existing regulatory frameworks may be used to implement bulkhead restrictions.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,1" the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled invalid as an uncompensated taking a state coastal zone
management agency's attempt to condition a building permit. 141 The
dispute arose when the California Coastal Commission (CCC) conditioned a permit to replace a bungalow with a larger house on the
dedication of an easement to allow public access along the portion of
the dry sand beach owned by the permittee. The easement did not
involve access to the beach from the street. The CCC argued that it
imposed the condition to mitigate the adverse impact of a new, larger
house that would block public view of the beach, "psychologically"
inhibit the public's recognition of its right of access, and increase
private use of the shorefront.' 4' The Court found that the permit
condition completely failed to further the legitimate state interest in
public health, safety and welfare. 43 Although the majority opinion
stated that a permit condition must bear a substantial relationship to a
valid public purpose, its actual holding that there was not even a
rational
relationship carries more precedential weight in defining the
144
test.
The Court acknowledged that the Nollans had no unfettered right
to build whatever they wished on the property and that the CCC had
a right to deny the permit if denial would further some legitimate

139. See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1984) [hereinafter
CZMA] (creating a voluntary program to encourage states to exercise their own authority to
establish and implement coastal management plans (hereinafter CMPs)). The CZMA is not a
grant of regulatory authority over private property to states. States with CMPs approved by
the federal government receive financial assistance and can prohibit (subject to the veto of
the U.S. Secretary of Commerce) federal activities not consistent with the CMP. This provision gives states with CMPs leverage to affect activities requiring federal permits, such as
dredge and fill operations. CZMA encourages states to plan how development should occur in
a coastal zone where land use has a direct impact on coastal waters. Id.

140. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 828.
143. Id at 841-42.
144. The requirement of a "substantial relationship" is often associated with strict scrutiny, which is a test of close analysis that serves to preserve substantive values of equality and
liberty. When strict scrutiny is the standard of review, a regulation is usually struck down.
See L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUIONAL LAW 1000-01 (1988). The standard due process
and equal protection test for constitutionality requires only a finding of a "rational relation.
ship." See Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 UCLA J.
ENva. L & POL'Y 139, 140 (1988).
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public purpose. 145 A crucial aspect of the Nollan case is that the

CCC had authority to deny the permit entirely.'

However, a condi-

tion on the permit that is unrelated to preservation of the public right
(of access, use, and view of the shore) that would be harmed by an
unconditional permit is invalid. The CCC probably could have conditioned the permit on the provision of a public view or access to the
beach.
A coastal management agency seeking to protect wetlands could
condition a permit for development or construction on a prohibition
of bulkheads. 47 Because the relationship between the presence of a
bulkhead and the inability of wetlands to migrate inland is substantial,
let alone rational, such a condition would meet the Nollan nexus test.
Moreover, it is the development itself that would motivate a property
owner to build a bulkhead in the first place.
The chief advantage of a policy to prohibit bulkheads on future
development (as opposed to all property) is that it can be implemented using an existing regulatory system to condition permits. Also, it
explicitly ties investments in property improvements to the expectation
that they must give way to migrating wetlands. However, these advantages come at a cost. Permits authorize a specific activity and do
not preclude the same or subsequent owner of the property from
returning to the permitting authority at a later date. Unless the permit
condition runs with the land as a covenant, the fastland remains vulnerable to subsequent permits that allow bulkheads. However, the
more tightly the permit condition runs with the land or effects a
permanent prohibition, the more likely it will be seen by a court as a
permanent physical occupation. It is important to recall, though, that
even a regulatory ban on all bulkheads is vulnerable to amendment
should political pressure persuade the government authority to allow
construction. Acquisition of the property interest by a relatively insulated party (such as a nongovernmental conservancy) provides the

145. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.

See also Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d

453, 456 (Me. 1987) (upholding the denial of a permit to re-build a house lost to coastal
erosion). The permit denial did not make the property substantially valueless because the
family had been occupying a motor home on the lot during the summer. See id. at 455-56.
146. In fact, without the power to deny the permit, the agency may have no authority to
condition the permit. The Nollan opinion offered no guidance for determining whether an
agency has the power to deny a permit in a particular case. It is likely that the three factors
discussed in the previous section would determine the issue. In this respect, the special case
of permit conditioning folds into the general regulatory takings analysis.
147. This assumes, of course, that wetlands migration is a legitimate public purpose. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:565

most durable wetlands protection if the financial resources are currently available."4
CONCLUSION

Under the traditional view of the public trust, states that assert
public ownership of intertidal lands may gain control of new wetlands
if landowners let their property fall under the influence of the tide.
This much is clear. The more difficult question is whether seawalls
serve as shields from the reach of the public trust. The flexibility of
the public trust doctrine and the application of takings law will determine whether coastal jurisdictions can implement bulkhead prohibitions without compensating landowners. States' public trust doctrines
offer greater promise than the federal navigational servitude to address
the public expectations to continue to enjoy the natural benefits of
coastal wetlands.
Professor Sax describes the primary justification of the modem
public trust doctrine that protects a wide variety of public resources
as "preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in
common but without formal recognition such as title." 149 Few courts
have explicitly recognized such a broad public right over private
property. Even those jurisdictions that have recognized broad public
rights, such as New Jersey, California, and Wisconsin, give little
indication that they would extend the right to restrict landowners who
wish to protect the existing character of their property. However, if
the public trust lives up to its potential as described by Sax, it may
be an effective tool in the future as changing circumstances demand
an explicit recognition of the public values served by threatened natural systems. 5 The most effective strategy today for encouraging
evolution in the doctrine is to put private landowners on notice of the
importance that the public places on coastal wetlands 5 ' and of the
role that today's fastlands will play in the future viability of marsh
ecosystems.
The same tension created by the conflict between public and

148. See Sa, The Fate, supra note 15.
149. Sax, Liberating, supra note 11, at 188.
150. See Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 308-09, 294 A.2d
47, 54 (1972) (quoted in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 NJ. 306, 316, 471
A.2d 355, 365 (1984), cert. denieA 469 U.S. 821 (1984)).
151. A serious commitment to planning, regulation, and acquisition to protect existing
marshes will bolster a government's case that private actions that doom wetlands are contrary

to a siguificant public interest.
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private expectations will surface in fifth amendment challenges to
bulkhead restrictions. If the regulation is a normal exercise of police
power (or commerce clause authority, in the case of federal regulation), not given special status by vindicating a public trust interest,
then it must surmount the takings hurdles or offer compensation. The
best touchstone for deciding whether outright prohibition of seawalls
on fastlands would be a taking is still Justice Holmes' standard of a
regulation that goes "too far." Whether a regulation goes "too far"
depends on the circumstances of the particular case. For instance, a
regulation that results in the taking of a small parcel, completely
vulnerable to inundation, may not result in a taking when applied to a
property large enough to retain fastland uses. A bulkhead prohibition
will most likely be upheld if it:
" advances human health, safety, or welfare (including business)
interests;
*
is based on a legislative finding that explicitly ties the regulation to the health, safety and welfare interests;
*
treats interference with a migrating wetland as a, nuisance; and
•
leaves a landowner with some viable economic use of her land
(a regulation might offer examples of some permissible types
of uses).
Policy-makers and coastal managers should use case law as a
guide for implementing strategies that balance public and private
expectations. However convoluted the legal fictions involved in applying takings and public trust doctrines, they are all designed to help
answer the basic question: whose expectations most deserve to be
maintained?'
A synthesis of the views of Professors Sax and
Michelman help probe the answer to this question at the core of
property interests and their adaptability to a warmer world. Sax would
maintain that the concentrated interests of the private landowner in
keeping property dry should be given no more weight by courts than
the cumulative, diffuse interests of the public in continuing its use of
the resources dependent on marshes. The role of the legislature is to
facilitate a resolution to the conflict of interests. Courts should require
compensation of landowners only when the regulation prohibits an"
activity that would have no adverse spillover effects on other people's
use of other resources.1'' If there are spillover effects, as surely is

152. See J. BEmTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGIsLAToN 68 (N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd. &
Oceana Publications, Inc. 1975) ("Property is nothing but a basis of expectation ....
.
153. Sax, Takings, supra note 11, at 163-64.
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the case where property owners build bulkheads that squeeze out
coastal wetlands, then courts should not second guess the balance
between interests struck by the legislature.
Michelman would not require compensation for a regulation
preventing a private activity that, "when the owner first began to
orient his decisions towards" the activity, was evidently in conflict
with crystallized expectations of others.1 -5 Early warning of public
expectations to maintain coastal wetlands, well in advance of inundation, makes the public interests evident and provides a nucleus for
their crystallization. Policy-makers can take advantage of the current
state of atmospheric and oceanograpic knowledge to act before private
landowners settle in their expectations to build bulkheads in the future. The tension between public and private interests will play out in
a race, not a tug-of-war. The interests that first crystallize into settled
expectations will pre-empt subsequently formed expectations from
claiming superior legal recognition. Environmentalists and others
concerned with coastal wetlands protection should be on notice that
now is the time to consider adaptive strategies not only for economic
efficiency reasons, but also for legal purposes.
The problem of coastal wetlands migration is just one of many
new challenges that climate change presents. Solving problems relating to the modification of agriculture, protection of endemic species,
and supply of fresh water, will raise many of the same legal issues.' s5 An early, effective, and equitable response will not just save
some of our dwindling coastal wetlands; it will set the tone for public
reaction to the many other uncertainties and environmental perturbations presented by global climate change.

154. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1242.
155. Analogous legal questions will arise from other consequences of global climate

change, such as: who will bear the costs of maintaining corridors for plants and animals to
migrate as climatic zones shift?; and under what conditions can farmers seed cloud to main.
tain historic levels of rainfall? See Solomon & Freedberg, supra note 3, at 104-09 (summarizing the problems presented by global warming to policy-makers).
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